What IT Teams Can Learn From OT About Store Security
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Connected store equipment often lives in a security accountability no-man's land. Facilities or Retail Operations teams are responsible for purchase and installation, and contract service providers may be responsible for remote monitoring and maintenance. This kind of equipment might stay in service for a decade or more, often running on firmware that never gets updated. These devices typically get excluded from the IT team's asset inventory since there's no explicit owner to tie them to, which means that they rarely appear in IT's security program reporting. This is a hidden vulnerability in many enterprises, one that gets ignored right up until something bad happens.
Grocery refrigeration became the example this fall. On the night of October 11, attackers reached refrigeration controllers at up to 700 French supermarkets and pushed them into extended defrost cycles. Some units reportedly reached 50°C (122°F), spoiling food and causing several fires. A similar wave hit chains in several more European countries on November 2. In the US, the Pentagon is investigating similar freezer failures at several military commissaries as a suspected cyberattack.
On November 5, CISA, the FBI and three other federal agencies issued a joint fact sheet warning that this activity is global and targets retail grocery and cold storage operators. On November 9, France formally attributed the October attack to a cyber unit linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. French authorities said the attackers reached the controllers through web interfaces exposed to the Internet, and that the attack caused at least 15 fires. The attribution covers only the French incidents. Pro-Russian groups claimed the November wave, but those claims haven't been verified.
This isn't solely an IT problem
It would be easy to read this as a patching story. Patching matters; the fix for the main vulnerability in the affected controller line had been available since August 2025. But the harder question is organizational. Who owns a refrigeration controller?
In many retail organizations, the answer is either "we're not sure," or "several people, partly." Facilities owns the equipment, and a refrigeration contractor may own the remote monitoring. IT sometimes owns the local network it connects to, and almost always owns the upstream Internet or WAN connectivity. Food safety owns the consequences of widespread spoilage. The cybersecurity team may or may not have visibility into the control points. There is almost never a single role or team that owns the risk end to end.
The business impact lands outside IT: discarded inventory, empty cold cases, food safety decisions made under duress, and restocking that can take days or weeks. Insurers told Reuters that cyber policies typically exclude physical losses like spoiled food, which makes this worth a conversation with your own risk team. This is an organizational concern, not just a technical problem, and it needs support at the senior leadership level.
Two different playbooks
IT security teams can be very good at what they do, but still be challenged by equipment like refrigeration controllers that live by different rules. Habits and practices that serve IT well don't always transfer to OT-like environments. WWT's OT security team made the point directly in their S4x26 conference recap: implementing OT security through an IT model often fails, and decades of IT security experience doesn't automatically translate into knowing how to secure OT.
| Typical IT practice | Typical OT reality | |
| What it protects first | Data | Uptime and physical safety (and in grocery, food safety) |
| How it's updated | Frequent, centrally managed patching | Infrequent, often controlled by a vendor or contractor |
| Who owns it | IT | Facilities, a contractor, or both |
| How long it stays in service | 3-7 years | Often a decade or more |
That last row isn't an exaggeration. One security executive told Bloomberg that retail refrigeration and HVAC systems are often 10 to 15 years old, meaning that many in-place systems were installed when cyber threats were a much smaller concern than they are today.
None of this makes IT's practices wrong. It's just that the people who manage operational technology have spent decades developing a different way of thinking about it, and most IT leaders have never been introduced to it.
A model OT teams already use
The Purdue model (formally the Purdue Enterprise Reference Architecture) describes how operational systems connect in layers, from physical equipment at the bottom to enterprise IT at the top. It began as an engineering reference in the early 1990s and later became a common way to decide where security boundaries belong. OT practitioners tend to know it well. In my experience, most IT practitioners have never heard of it. I first became aware of it when I started working with the manufacturing professionals who operate roasting plants, and it changed the way that I approached networking and security architecture in those facilities.
Read from the bottom up, a grocery version looks something like this: compressors and sensors, the controllers on each case and rack, the store's refrigeration system manager, site and regional monitoring, and then a boundary before enterprise IT and the Internet. The core idea is simple. Each layer should talk only to its neighbors, and anything coming from outside (a contractor's remote session or a cloud monitoring service) should stop at a controlled boundary rather than reach the equipment directly.
Seen through that lens, the security failure in the French incident is clear. The Internet reached the store controller directly, and the layers that the model would have put in the way were skipped.
If you want to go further, WWT's S4x26 recap includes an OT reference architecture drawn on the Purdue levels, and NIST SP 800-82 covers segmentation in OT environments in depth.
Purdue isn't a store blueprint
I'll add a caution here. The Purdue model was built for plants, not store estates. Many store networks were never designed in layers at all, and cloud-connected monitoring has blurred the boundaries the model assumes. Some practitioners argue that the model is showing its age.
That's a fair critique, but it misses the point for most retail leaders. The value of Purdue isn't in the exact number of levels. The value is in applying the discipline of asking which systems should be able to reach which other systems, and where an outside party's access should have to stop. Use it as a tool to help you ask better questions, not as a literal design for your store network.
Where zero trust fits
Zero trust complements Purdue rather than replacing it. Purdue helps you decide where the boundaries belong, while zero trust governs who and what can cross them, and on what terms.
Third-party access is the clearest example. A refrigeration technician should be able to reach the specific controller needed for a defined task, not gain broad access to the store network. Many retailers already have zero trust programs underway for users and applications. Extending those principles to store equipment and contractor access can be a more natural next step than starting something new.
A practical approach
The federal guidance is a reasonable place to start, and it maps cleanly onto the model:
- Know what you have. Build an inventory of store and distribution center equipment by site, vendor, model and firmware, and name an owner for each class of device.
- Keep the Internet away from the equipment. Remove Internet exposure from controller panels. If remote access is truly needed, route it through a controlled, current edge device.
- Put a controlled door between layers. Separate operational devices from business networks, and require strong authentication for any third party that crosses the boundary.
- Watch the settings, not just the network. Define safe setpoint ranges and alert on deviations, so a change at midnight triggers a response rather than a surprise the next morning.
- Plan for the bad night. Agree in advance how stores verify temperatures manually and who decides what product to discard. Food safety belongs in that plan. Tabletop exercises are excellent tools for surfacing hidden assumptions that could derail an emergency response.
Questions for your team
- Could we produce a list of every refrigeration controller in our estate, with its firmware version, this week?
- Which outside parties can reach our store equipment remotely, and how?
- Is any of our equipment directly reachable from the Internet?
- Who would see an unexpected setpoint change at 2 a.m.?
- Who owns this risk end to end?
How WWT can help
WWT's OT/IoT Security practice follows a three-part approach: assess the current state, design segmentation and validate it in our labs before deployment, then implement and sustain it with governance and incident response playbooks. The same discipline applies to choosing where to start. In one segmentation program with a large manufacturer, WWT deliberately piloted on an application that shared infrastructure with most of the company's other applications, so success would translate across the estate. Store estates benefit from the same thinking: pilot where the results will hold for a typical location, not an ideal one.
For senior leaders, a good first step is our 45-minute OT/IoT Security Briefing. For teams ready to go further, the OT Security Workshop brings IT and OT leaders into the same room to surface undocumented assets, governance gaps and risky connections, then builds a path from discovery through a pilot at selected sites to a business case for scale. If the European incidents have raised questions about your own estate, contact us to start the conversation.
Key takeaways
- This is an ownership problem first. Refrigeration and other store equipment often sit between facilities, contractors, IT and food safety, with no single owner of the risk.
- IT practices don't always transfer. Operational equipment is updated less often, stays in service longer, and is frequently managed by outside parties.
- The Purdue model gives leaders a shared vocabulary. It frames the right question: which systems should be able to reach which others, and where should outside access stop?
- Zero trust complements the model. It governs who can cross each boundary, which matters most for contractor access.
- Start with visibility. You can't segment or protect equipment you haven't inventoried.