In April 2026, a frontier AI model autonomously found dozens of real-world software vulnerabilities and wrote working exploits for most of them. That model is locked to a small circle of partners — but open-weight versions, downloadable by anyone and easily stripped of their guardrails, are only four to seven months behind. The implications run deeper than speed. Agentic attacks undercut the core assumption behind most detection: that a baseline can separate normal behavior from malicious behavior. That line blurs fast when legitimate AI agents and intruding ones operate side by side. Deception sidesteps the problem entirely. A decoy has no business purpose, so nothing legitimate ever touches it — one interaction is enough to trigger a trustworthy alert, no correlation needed. And an attacker probing every path at once trips far more decoys than any human would. Join these experts and learn why deception is now a day-one design decision, not a later-phase add-on.